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1. Introduction
According to Diamond’s (1965) OLG model it is possible to explain international capital
movements from differences in time preferences. However the Buiter (1981) OLG model,
shows that the ranking of stationary utility levels under autarky and openness is ambigu-
ous. His demonstration is graphical and utility and production functions are not specified.
Within the framework built by Buiter, we show that using an OLG model with a Cobb-
Douglas production function and logarithmic utility it is possible to explicitly solve the
model and determine the gains in well-being. These are positive for both countries only
if the autarky capital-labor ratios of both countries are on opposite sides of the golden
rule. We then generalize this result to all production and utility functions. Section 2,
presents the OLG model in an open economy. Section 3, describes transitional dynamics
and steady state. Section 4, determines the long-term gains of integration in the case of
the log utility and Cobb -Douglas functions. Section 5, generalizes the result.
2. The OLG model in open economy
In the OLG model of Diamond (1965), agents live for two periods. Young people consume
and save their labor income. The old consume their savings and the return on their
savings.
Basic Assumptions:
cyt + st = wt, c
o
t+1 = (1 + rt+1) st (1)
Logarithmic utility function:
Vt = ln c
y
t +
ln cot+1
1 + ρ
(2)
A Cobb-Douglas production function, with kt = Kt/Lt, the capital-labor ratio.
qt = Λk
α
t (3)
A world composed of two countries, ”Tilde” and ”Hat”, such that each variable and
parameter used a tilde or a hat to specify the country to which it refers. Variables have a
double tilde or double hat in closed economy (˜˜x, ˆˆx), a single tilde or hat in open economy
(x˜, xˆ). It is necessary to obtain a steady state that the rate of population growth (n)
is the same in each country. Assume for simplicity that countries have the same level
of technology (Λ), the same depreciation rate of capital (δ). Suppose the depreciation
rate for the period is unitary (δ = 1). This assumption is usual, and it simplifies the
transitional dynamics in open economies. The countries differ in two respects. As in
Buiter (1981), the two countries differ in the rate of time preference:
ρ˜ > ρˆ (4)
The relative size of Hat Country in the world is represented by ηˆ = Nˆ/(N˜+Nˆ), where
N=L is the size of population. We assume that the populations are different sizes.
η˜ 6= ηˆ (5)
In autarky, the wealth of each country is equal to its capital stock At = Kt, therefore
dividing by Nt wealth per worker in each country is:
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ˆˆat =
ˆˆ
kt and ˜˜at =
˜˜kt (6)
In each country, the increase in wealth is equal to the savings of the young, minus
spending by the old, who consume all their wealth (they are egoistic). So, for the country
Tilde: ˜˜At+1 −
˜˜At = N˜t ˜˜st −
˜˜At or
˜˜At+1 = N˜t ˜˜st or (1 + n)˜˜at+1 = ˜˜st.
The equilibrium conditions of the capital market in each closed economy are:
ˆˆst = (1 + n)
ˆˆ
kt+1 and ˜˜st = (1 + n)
˜˜kt+1 (7)
Maximizing (2) under (1) youth savings are deducted:
ˆˆst =
ˆˆwt
2 + ρˆ
and ˜˜st =
˜˜wt
2 + ρ˜
(8)
Maximizing producer profit under (3) yields the following factor prices:
ˆˆwt = (1− α)Λ
ˆˆ
kαt and ˜˜wt = (1− α)Λ
˜˜kαt (9)
ˆˆ
Rt = ˆˆrt + δ = αΛ
ˆˆ
kα−1t and
˜˜Rt = ˜˜rt + δ = αΛ
˜˜kα−1t (10)
Solving the recurrence equation obtained from (7),(8) and (9), steady state capital is
obtained in autarky, and as ρ˜ > ρˆ:
ˆˆ
k =
(
(1− α)Λ
(1 + n)(2 + ρˆ)
) 1
1−α
> ˜˜k =
(
(1− α)Λ
(1 + n)(2 + ρ˜)
) 1
1−α
(11)
In steady state autarky, as Tilde Country is more impatient, the savings are lower
˜˜s < ˆˆs, capital is lower ˜˜k <
ˆˆ
k, wages are lower ˜˜w < ˆˆw, production is lower ˜˜q < ˆˆq, the
interest rate is higher ˜˜r > ˆˆr, and Tilde Country is poorer ˜˜a < ˆˆa.
In open economies (labor is immobile) agents are able to hold domestic and foreign
securities1. Et denotes the net amount of foreign securities owned. The wealth of a
country is At = Kt + Et therefore dividing by Nt, wealth per worker in each country is:
a˜t = k˜t + e˜t, aˆt = kˆt + eˆt (12)
By hypothesis, the domestic and foreign securities are perfectly substitutable assets.
Thus, they reported the same rate of return r. The global arbitrage implies that the
world interest rate will be fixed ”between” the rates of Hat Country and Tilde Country
(˜˜r > r > ˆˆr). Since r > ˆˆr the agents of Hat Country prefer to lend their savings in the
global capital market (to agents of the Tilde Country), the Hat Country is a net lender
(eˆ > 0). Conversely, as ˜˜r > r agents of Tilde Country are net borrowers e˜ < 0. As
there are only two countries, net lending by one is net borrowing by the other, so by
construction: E˜t = −Eˆt and expressed in per capita variables:
e˜t < 0, eˆt > 0, η˜e˜t = −ηˆeˆt ∀t (13)
Since, at the instant of opening, the interest rate is the same in each country, as is
the per capital-labor ratio, and the wage rate:
1Or government bonds, see Darreau and Pigalle (2013)
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r˜t = rˆt = rt, k˜t = kˆt = kt, w˜t = wˆt = wt (14)
This does not mean that the two countries have the same wealth and the same in-
come. In open economies, it is important to distinguish between financial capital at and
productive capital owned nationally kt and to distinguish GDP (qt = Ak
α
t ) and GNP
(yt = qt +Rtet) where Rt = rt + δ. We deduce from the foregoing:
aˆt > a˜t, qˆt = q˜t, yˆt > y˜t (15)
The Hat Country with the lowest rate of time preference is always the richest at the
steady state of an open economy.
3. Steady state and transitional dynamic
In each country, the increase in wealth is equal to the savings of the young, minus spending
by the old, who consume all their wealth (as they are egoistic). For Hat Country: Aˆt+1−
Aˆt = Nˆtsˆt − Aˆt or else aˆt+1 = kˆt+1 + eˆt+1 =
sˆt
1+n
Thus, the saving for each country is:
s˜t = (1 + n)(k˜t+1 + e˜t+1) =
w˜t
2 + ρ˜
and sˆt = (1 + n)(kˆt+1 + eˆt+1) =
wˆt
2 + ρˆ
(16)
The equilibrium condition of the capital market in an open economy becomes: N˜ts˜t+
Nˆtsˆt = K˜t+1 + E˜t+1 + Kˆt+1 + Eˆt+1 which can be rewritten as:
η˜s˜t
1 + n
+
ηˆsˆt
1 + n
= η˜k˜t+1 + η˜e˜t+1 + ηˆkˆt+1 + ηˆeˆt+1 (17)
Since, η˜e˜t+1 = −ηˆeˆt+1 and kˆt+1 = k˜t+1 = kt+1 (17) beccomes
η˜s˜t
1+n
+ ηˆsˆt
1+n
= kt+1, then,
by replacing savings by its values, it becomes:
kt+1 =
η˜(1− α)Λkαt
(1 + n)(2 + ρ˜)
+
ηˆ(1− α)Λkαt
(1 + n)(2 + ρˆ)
(18)
This is a recurrence equation that describes the dynamics of the capital in an open
economy. At steady state kt+1 = kt = k
∗, by resolving the recurrence equation, steady
state capital-labor ratio in an open economy is:
k∗ =
(
η˜(1− α)Λ
(1 + n)(2 + ρ˜)
+
ηˆ(1− α)Λ
(1 + n)(2 + ρˆ)
) 1
1−α
(19)
The following figure illustrates the convergence and steady state. It assumes that
before the opening, the two countries were at steady state.
For Hat Country, since it is a net lender eˆ > 0, its capital is lower in an open economy.
Domestic agents spend a portion of their savings on investment outside the territory this
leads to a reduction of productive capital in the country. For the Tilde Country, since it is
a net borrower e˜ < 0 its capital is higher in the open economy. Productive capital in the
borrowing country is increased by the savings of foreigners coming to invest in the country.
Fig.(1), illustrates the transitional dynamics. At time of opening (t) Hat Country lends
ηˆeˆt = −η˜e˜t to Tilde Country. Hat Country reduces its capital stock, the rate of wages
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kt = kt+1kt+1
kt
˜˜kt k
∗ ˆˆktkt
ˆˆ
kt+1 =
(1−α)Λ
(1+n)(2+ρˆ)
ˆˆ
kαt
˜˜kt+1 =
(1−α)Λ
(1+n)(2+ρ˜)
˜˜kαt
kt+1 = ηˆ
(1−α)Λ
(1+n)(2+ρˆ)
kαt + η˜
(1−α)Λ
(1+n)(2+ρ˜)
kαt
η˜e˜t ηˆeˆt
0
Figure 1: Closed economies and open economy
and therefore their savings in the next period. The reverse is done for Tilde Country2 .
Given the concavity of production function, Hat Country’s saving decreases more than
Tilde Country’s saving increases. Globally, total saving decreases and therefore capital
stock for the next period decreases kt+1 < kt. The capital-labor ratio converges to k
∗ as
shown in Fig.(1). We see from the figure that the capital-labor ratio of the open world is
below the average capital-labor ratio of the two countries in autarky.
It is shown in Appendix B that
ˆˆ
k >
(
ηˆ
ˆˆ
k + η˜˜˜k
)
> k∗ > ˜˜k, ˆˆq > q∗ >
(
ηˆ ˆˆq + η˜ ˜˜q
)
> ˜˜q
and R∗ = ˜˜R
ˆˆ
R/
(
η˜
ˆˆ
R + ηˆ ˜˜R
)
.
Proposition 1 : The average capital-labor ratio is smaller in an open economy.
Proposition 2 :The average output per head is greater in an open economy if α ∈]0, 1/2[,
smaller if α ∈]1/2, 1[.
Proposition 3 : The interest rate in an open economy is the weighted harmonic mean
of autarky interest rates.
Our model reproduces all the findings of Buiter to which we add three additional
propositions that Buiter cannot give without specifying a production function. Buiter’s
Proposition 8, only indicates that the common steady-state open-economy capital-labor
ratio lies between the two autarkic capital-labor ratios.
2In the short-run the effect of openness on welfare is positive in Hat Country where the first generation
enjoys both, a high salary of autarky and high interest rates of the open economy. They are negative in
the country Tilde. See Buiter (1981) for the analysis of short-run effects.
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4. Long-Runs Gains from integration
We now study the long-term gains from integration. As Buiter, we will distinguish three
cases according to the position in autarky of capital-labor ratios relative to the capital-
labor ratio of the golden rule. It is well known that the golden rule is independent of the
utility function.
By maximizing consumption at steady state (max c = f(k)− (n+ δ) k), we obtain
the golden rule: f ′(k) = Rgold = n+ δ or rgold = n. This implies, using the Cobb-Douglas
production function and δ = 1 that:
Rgold = 1 + n⇒ kgold =
(
αΛ
1 + n
) 1
1−α
(20)
In a competitive economy where the utility function is a logarithmic function, the
capital-labor ratio at steady state is given by (11). Comparing (20) and (11) the specifi-
cation of functions implies:
˜˜k or
ˆˆ
k
<
>
kgold ⇔ α
>
<
1− α
2 + ρ
(21)
The left side of (21) is the share of capital and the right side is the savings rate of
the country (see Appendix C). We can now determine the effects on long-term welfare,
of integration, with our specification of production function using the Cobb-Douglas and
the utility function as a logarithmic function. By introducing in utility function (2) the
competitive equilibrium values of consumption and factor prices 3 we can write the steady
state utility as a function of capital-labor ratio at steady state:
V = ln
(
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
)
−
ln(2 + ρ)
1 + ρ
+
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
ln((1− α)Λ)+
1
1 + ρ
ln(αΛ)+
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
(
α−
1− α
2 + ρ
)
lnk
With
∂V
∂k
>
<
0 if α
>
<
1− α
2 + ρ
(22)
Taking into account that an open economy decreases the capital-labor ratio of the Hat
Country and increases the capital-labor ratio of Tilde Country we obtain the following
results from (21) and (22) in the three cases described by Buiter:
• Case 1. Both countries are in dynamic inefficiency in autarky (˜˜k > kgold and
ˆˆ
k > kgold): Hat Contry have a higher and Tilde Contry have a lower stationary
utility level (ambiguous in Buiter).
• Case 2. Both countries are in dynamic efficiency in autarky (˜˜k < kgold and
ˆˆ
k < kgold):
Hat Country have a lower (ambiguous in Buiter) and Tilde Country have a higher
stationary utility level.
• Case 3. Countries are in autarky on opposite sides of the golden rule ((˜˜k < kgold and
ˆˆ
k > kgold): Hat Country have a higher (ambiguous in Buiter) and Tilde Country
have a higher (ambiguous in Buiter) stationary utility level.
3cyt = wt − st,c
o
t+1(1 + rt+1)st, wt = (1− α)Λk
α
t ,(1 + rt+1) = αΛk
α−1
t+1 , and st = wt/(2 + ρ)
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Proposition 4 : With the Cobb-Douglas production function and log-utility function,
the two countries have highers stationary utility levels only if the autarky capital-labor
ratios are on opposite sides of the golden rule.
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function and log-utility function we avoid any
ambiguity highlighted by Buiter. One could discuss whether this result does not come
from the neutralization of substitution effects related to the use of the log-utility function.
In particular, we might ask whether Hat Country does not benefit from higher interest
rate. The following section shows that Proposition 4 remains true regardless of the utility
and production functions.
5. Generalization
We generalize the previous result to all separable utility functions and all production
functions with constant returns to scale with the OLG model.
Hypothesis 1: We retain the general specification of separable utility function and
constraints of the OLG model to express the utility in terms of factor prices:
U (cy, co) = u(cy) +
1
1 + ρ
u(co) with u′(c) > 0 and u′′(c) < 0
cy = w − s(w, r) and co = (1 + r)s(w, r)
According to the implicit function theorem in the plane (w, r) the slope of the indif-
ference curve (IC) is4:
dw
dr
= −
∂U
∂r
∂U
∂w
= −
− ∂u
∂cy
∂s
∂r
+ 1
(1+ρ)
∂u
∂co
(
s+ (1 + r)∂s
∂r
)
∂u
∂cy
(
1− ∂s
∂w
)
+ 1
(1+ρ)
∂u
∂co
∂s
∂w
(1 + r)
= −
s
1 + r
(23)
Hypothesis 2: We retain the general form of a production function with constant returns
to scale and we use the condition of competitive factor prices :
F (K,L) = Lf(k) with f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0 thus w = f(k)− (r + δ)k
Samuelson (1962) showed that in the plane (w, r) the slope of the Factor-Price Frontier
(FPF) is :
dw
dr
= −k (24)
In autarky and at steady state in the OLG model, the equilibrium condition of the
capital-labor ratio market is:
s = (1 + n)k (25)
From the three previous equations we can deduce that (In autarky and at steady state)
the slopes of the indifference curve and the FPF are equal if:
IC slope = −
1 + n
1 + r
k = −k = FPF slope (26)
4Dividing by ∂u
∂co
and using u
′(cy)
u′(co) =
(1+r)
(1+ρ) we get the result.
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w
r
ˆˆ
U
˜˜U
FPF
ˆˆ
E
˜˜E
G
rgoldˆˆr ˜˜r
w
r
˜˜U
ˆˆ
U
FPF
G
rgold ˆˆr ˜˜r
ˆˆ
E
˜˜E
Figure 2: Indifference Curve and Factor-Price Frontier
That is if country is at golden rule (r = n). Outside the golden rule, if (r < n) then
IC slope < FPF slope, if (r > n) then IC slope > FPF slope.
So in the plane (w, r), at left (right) of the golden rule, the slope of IC is lower
(upper) the slope of the FPF. It follows therefore, that the stationary utility increases
for a country at left (right) of the golden rule only if the capital-labor ratio decreases
(increases). Since we have shown that during the capital market integration the capital-
labor ratio increases for Tilde Country and decreases for Hat Country, the stationary
utility level of Tilde Country and Hat Country can increase only if, in autarky, Tilde
Country is on the right and Hat Country is on the left of the golden rule.
Proposition 5 : In the OLG model, both countries increase their stationary utility levels
only if the autarky capital-labor ratios are on opposite sides of the golden rule.
Figure 2 illustrates this result. In autarky and at steady state, for given prices ( ˆˆw, ˆˆr)
, the Hat Country maximizes its utility at point
ˆˆ
E. On the left graph, the slope of IC
is less than the slope of FPF. The utility may be greater for a lower capital-labor ratio.
The situation is the opposite for Tilde Country. Its utility may be greater for an upper
capital-labor ratio.
The capital market integration increases the utility of both countries only if the two
countries are on either side of the golden rule, not where the capital-labor ratio of the
two countries is below or above the golden rule. The right graph of figure 2, shows that
a lower capital-labor ratio decreases Hat Contry steady state utility. Thus both figures 5
and 6 are impossible in Buiter (p 792) (see Appendix D).
The message of this general result is important. The capital market integration nec-
essarily reduces the capital of the most patient country. In the OLG model, the most
patient country can only gain from long-term capital market integration if it is in autarky
in dynamic inefficiency. Which may be the case of for China at present. The corollary is
that, in the long run, a country in efficiency cannot gain from investing capital in foreign
markets. Maddison (1982) stressed that the slowdown in economic growth in the U.K.
at the end of the 19th century was due to the fact that it had a massive foreign capital
investment which was as high as its domestic investment.
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6. Conclusion
In the OLG model, countries do not consistently gain well-being in the long run, when
they integrate their capital markets. We have shown, in the OLG model, both countries
will only gain in the particular case where they are both in autarky on opposite sides of
the golden rule. More specifically the most patient country, net lender, can only gain if
it is in autarky in dynamic inefficiency, with too much capital.
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Appendix A
• Consumption in an open economy (for Tilde Country): In an open economy
savings equals s˜t = (1 + n)a˜t+1 Consumption of young is:
c˜yt = wt − st = (1− α)Λk
α
t − (1 + n)a˜t+1 (27)
Consumption of old at date t+1 : c˜ot = (1+rt+1)(1+n)a˜t+1 and at t:
c˜ot
1+n
= (1+rt)a˜t
Total comsumption per capita of workers at t is:
c˜t = (1− α)Λk
α
t − (1 + n)a˜t+1 + (1 + rt)a˜t (28)
• Trade balance (for Tilde Country):
By definition : Z˜t = (X˜t−M˜t) = Q˜t− C˜t− I˜t = N˜tf(kt)−(c˜
y
t N˜t+ c˜
o
t N˜t−1)−(K˜t+1−
K˜t + δK˜t). Dividing by N˜t: z˜t = f(kt)−
(
c˜jt +
c˜vt
1+n
)
− ((1 + n)kt+1 − (1− δ)kt)
z˜t = f(kt)− c˜t − ((1 + n)kt+1 − (1− δ)kt) (29)
• Current account: By definition C˜Ct = Z˜t + RtE˜t = Z˜t + Rt(A˜t − K˜t). Dividing
by N˜t:
c˜ct = z˜t +Rt(a˜t − kt) (30)
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We can also write the current account as the excess of savings relative to investment:
c˜ct = ((1 + n)a˜t+1 − (1− δ)a˜t)− ((1 + n)kt+1 − (1− δ)kt) (31)
It can also be written as the increase in the holding of securities: C˜Ct = E˜t+1 −
(1− δ) E˜t
c˜ct = (1 + n)e˜t+1 − (1− δ)e˜t (32)
• At steady state we obtain:
(30) becomes:
c˜c = z˜ +Re˜ (33)
(31) becomes:
c˜c = (n+ δ)(a˜− k) (34)
(29) becomes:
z˜ = f(k)− c˜− (n+ δ)k (35)
Using (33) and (34) z˜ becomes:
z˜ = (n− r)e˜ (36)
(28) becomes:
c˜ = Λkα − (n+ δ)k + (r − n)e˜ = Λkα − (n+ δ)k − z˜ (37)
and finally :
c = ηˆcˆ+ η˜c˜ = Λkα − (n+ δ)k (38)
Appendix B
• Proposition 1: The capital-labor ratio decreases in an open economy.
Show that
(
ηˆkˆ + η˜k˜
)
> k∗ where
(
ηˆkˆ + η˜k˜
)
is the world average capita-labor ratio
in autarky. Assuming X =
(
(1−α)Λ
(1+n)(2+ρ)
)
, since α ∈ ]0, 1[, we have 1
1−α
> 1 and the
function X
1
1−α is convex and therefore ηˆXˆ
1
1−α + η˜X˜
1
1−α >
(
ηˆXˆ + η˜X˜
) 1
1−α
.
• Proposition 2: Output per capita increases in global open economy if 0 < α < 1/2
and decrease if 1/2 < α < 1.
We will show that q∗ > ηˆqˆ + η˜q˜ where ηˆqˆ + η˜q˜ is the average output per worker in
autarky and q = kα. Since 0 < α < 1/2, we have 0 < α
1−α
< 1 and the function
X
α
1−α is concave and thus
(
ηˆXˆ + η˜X˜
) α
1−α
> ηˆ
(
Xˆ
) α
1−α
+ η˜
(
X˜
) α
1−α
. Conversely if
1/2 < α < 1 the function is convex and the average per worker world production
decreases.
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• Proposition 3: The open economy interest rate is the weighted harmonic average
interest rate of autarky.
In autarky for Hat country:
ˆˆ
R = αΛ
ˆˆ
kα−1 = αΛ
(
Xˆ
)α−1
1−α
In open economy: R = αΛkα−1 = αΛ
(
η˜X˜ + ηˆXˆ
)α−1
1−α
R = αΛ
(
η˜
αΛ
˜˜R
+ ηˆ
αΛ
ˆˆ
R
)
−1
= αΛ
(
˜˜R
ˆˆ
R
η˜αΛ
ˆˆ
R + ηˆαΛ ˜˜R
)
=
˜˜R
ˆˆ
R
η˜
ˆˆ
R + ηˆ ˜˜R
Appendix C
• The saving rate: Young’s savings is: st =
wt
2+ρ
= 1−α
2+ρ
yt = ζ.yt. The overall
savings for the period t, t + 1 is: St = Ntst − (Kt − δKt) whether St = Ntζyt −
ζYt−1+δςYt−1 therefore
St
Yt
= ζ Yt
Yt
−ζ Yt−1
Yt
+δζ Yt−1
Yt
therefore St
Yt
= ζ−ζ 1
(1+n)
+δζ 1
(1+n)
.
Macroeconomic saving rate is:
e = ζ
(
1−
1
(1 + n)
+
δ
(1 + n)
)
= ζ
(
δ + n
1 + n
)
Assuming δ = 1, the saving rate is: e = ζ = (1−α)
2+ρ
Appendix D
The case of Fig.6 in Buiter (p. 792) correspond to the following figure in our plan (w, r).
We showed that this case is impossible. One country (Hat) having a capital-labor ratio
lower than the golden rule capital-labor ratio cannot have at steady state an IC slope less
than the slope of the FPF as shown in the following figure.
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˜˜U
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G
rgold ˆˆr ˜˜r
wgold
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U
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E
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Figure 3: Impossible case of Buiter
On its Fig.6 (p. 792), Buiter draws a constraint whose slope is dependent on r and
the intercept depends on w. But there is a link between r and w (our FPF) which Buiter
ignores. The strong increase in r that Buiter represents, implies a strong decrease in w
and therefore the intercept of the constraint can be as high as Buiter illustrated.
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